

DOES MILITARY CULTURE ADEQUATELY PREPARE SENIOR LEADERS TO PROVIDE CLEAR OBJECTIVE, AND USEFUL STRATEGIC ADVICE?

**A Monograph
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Abstract

DOES MILITARY CULTURE ADEQUATELY PREPARE SENIOR LEADERS TO PROVIDE CLEAR OBJECTIVE, AND USEFUL STRATEGIC ADVICE? by LTC Juan K. Ulloa, U.S. Army, 59 pages.

Current and past military commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea, and Vietnam have been influenced by military advice to civilian leaders over the past 60+ years. This monograph examines whether today's military processes and culture adequately develop and prepare senior officers to render clear, objective, useful advice to their civilian leaders.

This study develops and analyzes a profile of senior U.S. military leaders along five dimensions: physical, experience, military mindset, Western mindset, and personality. The basic profile indicates that most senior leaders are elderly, white males who are successful tactical professionals selected overwhelmingly from the "core" of each service. They generally feel a profound sense of responsibility to defend the nation which manifests itself in risk averse behavior when estimating threats to the nation resulting in a strong inclination towards maintaining a strong extant military. They tend to have Orientalist tendencies and are endowed with a strong desire to control any situation they are a part of, focusing on direct solutions. Finally, senior leaders are almost exclusively logical, principled decision makers who are good organizers. They work well within hierarchical organizations, tend to avoid organizational conflict, and are resistant to change.

In order to overcome any negative consequences of the characteristics associated with this profile, this monograph recommends that senior leaders first become self-aware of the inherent constraints to behavior and action that the profile suggests. This will help the leader to consider the implications of his personal biases before thinking about solutions and making decisions. Second, this monograph recommends that senior leaders surround themselves with a diverse group of advisors and analysts who think both similarly and differently from the senior leader. By surrounding himself with a diverse staff with varied backgrounds, the senior leader will expose himself to different views. By considering those different views, the leader will allow innovation to take place and make better, more informed decisions.

Finally, this monograph recognizes that these characteristics are present for a reason. They likely are the Darwinian product of an evolution that chose the fittest traits for survival because they work – they ensure the nation has the best senior officers to ensure the security of the nation. The main question is whether the evolution which is based on successes of the past is adequate for success in the future.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction	1
Chapter 2: Senior Leader Military Culture.....	5
Section A. Making a Senior Leader.....	5
Section B. Theory	8
Section C. Where you stand depends on where you sat	15
Innate versus Learned.....	16
Cultural Constraints.....	18
Control.....	19
Rational versus Irrational Behavior.....	19
Section D. Personality Profile of Senior Leaders	21
Chapter 3: Senior Military Leader Profile: Analysis and Recommendations	26
Section A. Analysis	28
Physical	29
Experience.....	30
Military Mindset.....	35
Western Mindset	39
Personality.....	47
Section B. Recommendations.....	50
Physical	51
Experience.....	51
Military Mindset.....	52
Western Mindset	52
Personality.....	53
Chapter 4: Conclusions	53
BIBLIOGRAPHY	56

Chapter 1: Introduction

Current and past military commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea, and Vietnam have been influenced by military advice to civilian leaders over the past 60+ years. This monograph will examine whether today's military processes and culture adequately develop and prepare senior officers to render clear, objective, useful advice to their civilian leaders. Further, this paper asserts that advice from senior military leaders is largely based on a culture that overwhelmingly rewards tactical success and breeds senior military leaders who are conservative and conformist in nature.

This study posits that the inability of senior leaders to understand their personal biases toward quick, tactical solutions and their Western-based conceptions of "Orientalism"¹ inevitably lead to tainted and oftentimes bad strategic military advice to senior civilian leaders. At the core of this advice is a conservative, hegemonic military culture that consistently overestimates the capabilities of our enemies, overvalues the efficacy of Western solutions to Eastern problems, and undervalues and often dismisses the contributions and potential contributions of our Eastern allies and military partners for defense of their own countries. This dynamic is a major contributor to the United States committing excessive resources for extended periods of time in support of allies and military partners in the Republic of Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.

In Korea the United States military maintains a military presence in excess of 37,000 troops in support of the Republic of Korea (ROK) to defend against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).² Our assistance to the ROK may be logical when considered in terms

¹ Orientalism is a word coined by Edward W. Said in his book *Orientalism* published in 1994. It essentially is a theory of Western behavior that is based on the inclination to dominate peoples of the Orient. According to Said, Orientalism is the basis for Western dominance and intolerance of non-Westerns. This is explained in more detail in Chapter 2, Section C.

² GlobalSecurity.org, "U.S. Forces, Korea / Combined Forces Command Combined Ground Component Command (GCC)," GlobalSecurity.org. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/usfk.htm> (accessed January 1, 2012).

of raw numbers of DPRK versus ROK forces, ~1.1 million active versus 687,000 active respectively. However, this becomes questionable when viewed from the perspective of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The CIA World Factbook estimates the 2010 GDP of the ROK at just over \$1 trillion and the 2009 DPRK GDP at around \$28 billion³. In other words, the ROK economy is almost 36 times the size of the DPRK economy. Military advice that continues to insist that continued, long-term United States presence is *required* to defend the ROK against the DPRK is clearly not accounting for some key facts, and assumes that the United States values ROK security more than the ROK does.

At the height of United States political and military commitment during the Vietnam War over, 530,000 United States troops engaged in and bore the brunt of the fight against North Vietnam *on behalf of* South Vietnam.⁴ Because of United States' overestimation of North Vietnamese capabilities and undervaluation of potential South Vietnamese contributions, the United States opted to relegate South Vietnamese forces to the fight against the Viet Cong in lieu of training and employing them in the fight against the existential threat posed by the regular forces of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)⁵.

Early "Americanization" of the war effort traded valuable time to train and develop conventional Vietnamese forces for a perceived requirement for U.S. control and leadership.⁶ Eventually, popular and political pressures forced "Vietnamization" of the war effort and transitioned control of the war to South Vietnam under highly aggressive, politically driven

³ Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Fact Book," cia.gov.
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2195.html#ks> (accessed online on 9 January 2012).

⁴ George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975* (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2002), 182-183.

⁵ Cao Va Vien and Dong Van Khuyen, "Indochina Monographs: Reflections on the Vietnam War" (Monograph, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980), 56-57.

⁶ Reflections on the Vietnam War, 80, 83-84.

timetables for force reductions and troop ceilings.⁷ In the end, the transition was hasty, forced by political realities instead of military necessities⁸, and was ultimately a failure because early military advice and strategy failed to understand the nature of the conflict and to develop a South Vietnamese solution to the problem.

It could be argued that similar patterns based on culturally biased military advice and strategy are evident in how the United States prosecuted operations in Iraq and continues to prosecute operations in Afghanistan. Solutions to both conflicts were largely based on Western philosophies of governance and security, transitions to host nation control were slow, and troop requirements were largely based on opaque military requirements and conditions that reflected a conservative senior military culture. Because of these and other factors, this monograph claims that flawed military strategies and political necessity drove the end-game strategy for Iraq and are driving the end-game strategy for Afghanistan instead of prudent military strategy based on clear, unbiased analysis and in-depth understanding of the cultures of our foes and our friends as well as our own.

At the heart of these flawed strategies in dealing with conflict in non-Western, oriental, areas is a U.S. military culture rooted in Western mythology, history, and military theory. To wit, today's Army and Joint Doctrines champion seminal Jominian and Clausewitzian tenets as major elements of operational art designed to bring the enemy Army to heel.⁹ Many of these tenets are

⁷ Ibid., 87, 91.

⁸ Len Colodny and Tom Shachtman, *The Forty Years War: The Rise and Fall of the Neocons, from Nixon to Obama* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 2010), 59-60.

⁹ Paragraph 7-12 of the February 2011 edition of *FM 3-0, Operations* states that a campaign is a "series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space (JP 5-0). A *major operation* is a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area." Paragraph 7-25 goes on to list as elements of operational art: end state and conditions, centers of gravity, direct or indirect approach, decisive points, lines of operations/efforts, operational reach, tempo, simultaneity and depth, phasing and transitions, culmination and risk. Similarly, the August 2011 edition of *JP 5-0, Joint Operational Planning* lists the elements of operational design as: termination, military end state, objectives, effects, center of gravity,

coherent only within the context of Western military thought, and approach irrelevancy within the context of campaigns fought against non-Western foes. This idea is particularly compelling in campaigns in foreign lands where “the U.S. struggles to translate tactical battlefield supremacy into lasting political triumph.”¹⁰

This monograph will explore the foundations of Western-based American military culture in order to assess whether the advice senior military leaders render is sufficiently objective, original, and unbiased that it is credible and relevant to civilian leaders. Chapter 2 will explore and identify the military culture that defines senior military leaders. By scrutinizing theoretical studies of the military man and the military mind, analyzing the tactical underpinnings that form the core of senior leaders’ cultures, personalities and backgrounds, and exploring the personality profiles of senior military leaders, this chapter will define a theoretical construct regarding the strengths and limitations of United States military culture. The output from this chapter will be a profile of the American senior military officer against which to compare the military advice rendered by senior military leaders in chapter 3, which will analyze the profile subjectively through the lens of Generals William C. Westmoreland, the Commander of the Military Assistance Group Vietnam, and General Richard G. Stilwell, the Commander of the United Nations Command in Korea and through the lens of basic psychological profiling. Chapter 3 will conclude with some recommendations for senior leaders to assist in mitigating the natural biases

decisive points, lines of operation and lines of effort, direct and indirect approach, anticipation, operational reach, culmination, arranging operations, and forces and functions. Of these, the concepts of center of gravity (Clausewitz, *On War*, 595-596), culminating point (Clausewitz, *On War*, 528), and operational reach and tempo (Clausewitz, *On War*, 599-600) are Clausewitzian concepts; while lines of operations and decisive points (Jomini, *Art of War*, 85-86) are Jominian concepts that define and organize the objectives and conduct of military campaigns. These concepts are ubiquitous within U.S. military doctrine while Eastern concepts such as *Yin* and *Yang* (Sawyer, *Art of War*, 149), the *Way* or *Tao* (Sawyer, *Art of War*, 167), deception (Sawyer, *Art of War*, 168), and the idea that the highest forms of warfare consist of attacking enemy plans and alliances while the lowest forms consist of attacking the enemy Armies and cities (Sawyer, *Art of War*, 177) are conspicuous in their virtual absence from that same doctrine.

¹⁰ Patrick Porter, *Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 7.

the profile suggests. Finally, chapter 4 will summarize the lessons of this monograph and conclude the study.

Chapter 2: Senior Leader Military Culture

This chapter will explore senior leader culture in the United States military. While understanding that there is no absolute single military culture within the United States Army much less the United States Armed Forces, this monograph will demonstrate that there is a common pervasive cultural subtext that defines the basic characteristics of senior military leaders in the United States Military. The purpose of this chapter is to identify those basic, common characteristics that undergird military culture in all of the services in an effort to explain the perspective from which senior military leaders provide advice to civil authorities.

Section A will analyze theoretical frameworks of why military culture and the military profession develop the officers that it does. Section B will analyze that theory through the lens of a Western culture of Orientalism in order to highlight inherent Western predispositions. The purpose of the section is to explore the Western cultural predispositions that define the Occident and the Orient. Section C will use the Myers-Briggs type indicator test to study the personality profiles of successful military, primarily Army, leaders and posit what personality types rise to the top and why. And finally, Section D will compile the analysis from the previous sections into a personality profile of senior military leaders based on military and Western culture and the characteristics that make successful high-ranking officers in the United States military.

Section A. Making a Senior Leader

The military is different from most lines of work. The demands of military life include submitting to a lifestyle that is in many ways Spartan and giving up many freedoms that ordinary citizens take for granted; it involves living by a code that is foreign to most people. That code is

codified in things such as the Army Values – Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage;¹¹ the Navy and Marine Corps Values – Honor, Courage, Commitment;¹² the Air Force Values – Integrity First, Service Before Self, and Excellence in All We Do;¹³ and the Coast Guard Values – Honor, Respect, and Devotion to Duty.¹⁴ These values reinforce a code that requires a warrior spirit, discipline, loyalty, dedication, and obedience to orders often in environments that are inhospitable and dangerous. While the keepers of the standards and standard bearers for the military are generally the noncommissioned officers, those that set and exemplify those standards and codes are the commissioned officers.

Commissioned officers in the United States military are first and foremost citizens of the United States. As such they are generally Westerners and mostly representative of the U.S. population, as indicated by United States Military Academy (USMA) and Reserve Officer Training Course (ROTC) recruits from 2004-2007.¹⁵

To continue to progress, cadets and officers alike must demonstrate competency at their current rank and potential for continued service at higher ranks. This dynamic means that qualified officers get selected for promotion based on demonstrated proficiency at the current grade and *perceived* potential for service at higher grades. The supposition, indeed the prerequisite, is that success at the current grade is required for promotion to the next grade. The system thus requires that the senior leader who is a strategic leader must prove himself or herself first at the tactical level, then at the operational level, in order to be promoted to and tested at the

¹¹ Army Values accessed at <http://www.army.mil/values/> on 29 December 2011.

¹² Marine Corps Values accessed at http://www.usmcpres.com/heritage/corp_values.htm and http://www.navy.mil/navydata/navy_legacy_hr.asp?id=193 on 29 December 2011.

¹³ Air Force Values accessed at <http://www.airforce.com/learn-about/our-values/> on 29 December 2011.

¹⁴ Coast Guard Values accessed at <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg3/cg3pcx/corevalues.asp> on 29 December 2011.

¹⁵ Shanea Watkins, Ph.D. and James Sherk, “Who Serves in the U.S. Military? The Demographics of Enlisted Troops and Officers” (Center for Data Analysis Report #08-05 on National Security and Defense, 2008).

strategic level.¹⁶ A byproduct of this system is that senior leaders in the military tend to be in their late forties and fifties; they have to work their way through the system.¹⁷ In general, the services promote the best qualified officers, so the system ensures that the most senior leaders are well-rounded and understand and are proficient at all previous levels of the military, while anticipating, through subjective evaluations and assessments, that the leader will be proficient at the level to which he or she is promoted.

Looking at demographics once again, a 2010 Military Leadership Diversity Commission Issue Paper suggests that by the time the USMA or ROTC cadet becomes a senior leader, the officer is more likely to be white and male; over time a higher proportion the population of military officers that are female and/or minorities either self-select out of the military or are not selected for general officer than their white, male counterparts.¹⁸ Possibly this is because the most senior officers in the military are drawn from the core of each service – for the Army and the Marine Corps the Combat Arms, for the Navy the Aviators, Submariners, and Surface Warfare Officers, and for the Air Force combat pilots. Currently, at the highest levels, the Chairman of the

¹⁶ *JP 3-0, Joint Operations*, 2011 acknowledges and explains the concept of three overlapping levels of war – Strategic, Operational, and tactical on pages I-12 to I-14. The strategic level of war is primarily concerned with the idea or set of ideas for employing the military instrument of war; the operational level of war is concerned with the employment of tactical forces to achieve strategic and operational objectives thereby linking the tactics with the strategy, while the tactical level of war is the employment and arrangement of forces to conduct battles, activities, and engagements. The three levels of war are useful in that they help commanders to visualize “a logical arrangement of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command.” (I-12) They are interrelated in that do not exist independently of one another, overlap, and actions at one level can have profound implications at the other levels.

¹⁷ Demographics according to FAS lists average Air Force intelligence officer Colonels at 49, Brigadier Generals at 49, Major Generals at 52, and Lieutenant Generals at 54 (<http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/aia/cyberspokesman/97aug/demo.htm>). On the Army roster of General Officers, the youngest year group is 1989 (promotable COL as of 11 January 2012); barring extremely early high school graduation and commissioning this would make those individuals 44+ years of age; the oldest year group is 1971 – corresponds to 62+ years of age (05 January 2012 Army General Officer Public Roster (By Rank)). Available on the General Officers Management Office website at <https://www.gomo.army.mil/ext/portal/ReportsResources.aspx?Action=Reports> (restricted to Army CAC access only).

¹⁸ _____. “Demographic Profile of Active-Duty Officer Corps: September 2008 Snapshot” (Military Leadership Diversity Commission Issue Paper #13, 2010), 2-3.

Joint Chiefs of Staffs, the service Chiefs of Staffs and all of the Ground Combatant Commanders are from that group.¹⁹

In summary, we can expect that most senior leaders, general and flag officers, in the military are representative of the core communities of their service. They are most likely to be white males, and are at least highly proficient at the lower level of command and likely proficient at the current and higher level of command.²⁰ Bringing this to a practical assessment, it can be generally understood that one and two star commanders will be tactically excellent and possibly proficient at the highest tactical and lowest operational levels in which they operate. Similarly, three star commanders can be expected to be excellent tactically and at the lower operational level and possibly proficient at higher operational levels at which they operate, while four star commanders can be expected to be excellent tactically and operationally; possibly proficient at the strategic level within which they operate.

Section B. Theory

Clausewitz wrote that “[w]ar is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”²¹ If one accepts Clausewitz’ statement as a truism, and one accepts Huntington’s notion that “[t]he direction, operation, and control of a human organization whose primary function is the

¹⁹ Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff – General Dempsey (US Army – Armor), Chief of Staff of the Army – General Odierno (Field Artillery), Chief of Staff of the Air Force – General Schwarz (qualified AC130 pilot among other listed qualifications), Chief of Naval Operations – Admiral Greenert (submariner), EUCOM – Admiral Stavridis (US Navy – Surface Warfare Officer), AFRICOM – General Hamm (US Army – Infantry), PACOM – Admiral Willard (US Navy – F-14 Naval Aviator), NORTHCOM – General Jacoby Jr (US Army – Infantry), and SOUTHCOM – General Fraser (US Air Force – F-15/16 pilot).

²⁰ According to the “General Officer Minority Report - Total Force” and the “General Officer Female Report Total Force” both dated Thursday, January 5, 2012; only 12.04% of General officers in the Army were not white as of 05 January 2012 and only 6.48% of officers were not male as of 05 January 2012. Available on the General Officers Management Office website at <https://www.gomo.army.mil/ext/portal/ReportsResources.aspx?Action=Reports> (restricted to Army CAC access only).

²¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.

application of violence is a peculiar skill of the officer,”²² then at its core, an officer’s world revolves around practical solutions to complex, messy, political problems that our country has decided to resolve through the application of violence. It would follow then that, above all else, the ideal military leader would be pragmatic.

According to Huntington the military feels a profound responsibility to provide for the security of the state, which causes military officers to stress existing risks in their threat analysis and to emphasize and magnify the immediacy of those threats. Further, because of the consequences associated with making mistakes, military officials favor an overwhelmingly strong, extant military capability to oppose or offset those threats.²³ Huntington goes on to emphasize the executive function of the military in implementing the orders of the state. The consequence of that function is a purpose-built, hierarchical organization that requires obedience at every level. Notwithstanding the constitutional leadership of civilians over the military, Huntington concludes that, “loyalty and obedience are the highest of military virtues,”²⁴ and the U.S. military assumes that “[t]he superior political wisdom of the statesman must be accepted as a fact.”²⁵ Thus, when given an order, failure is not an option, and when failure is not an option, the military creates as resilient a buffer between failure and success as possible. In short, whether real or perceived, the military as an institution is risk averse when it comes to defending the nation and its interests, which leads to inflating the capabilities of our enemies overstating the requirements for a counterbalancing United States military capability.

According to Huntington, “...the military man rarely favors war. He will always argue that the danger of war requires increased armaments; he will seldom argue that increased

²² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1957), 10.

²³ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 65-68.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 73.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 76.

armaments make war practical or desirable. He always favors preparedness, but he never feels prepared... He is afraid of war. He wants to prepare for war. But he is never ready to fight a war.”²⁶ This frame of mind likely leads the military to strive to maximize the effectiveness of any extant military force by being exceptionally diligent at maximizing preparedness through enforcement of hard, realistic training; exceptional emphasis on the maintenance of warfighting equipment; and ensuring personnel and families are prepared for the hardships of deployment and war. Finally, when possible, the military maximizes preparedness by acquiring resources that support maximum preparedness and as large and professional a force as possible to defend against the most heinous enemies of the state. The military’s obsession with avoiding risk is perhaps understandable if we consider Clausewitz’ notion that “[i]n war more than anywhere else things do not turn out as we expect. Nearby they do not appear as they did from a distance.”²⁷ Further, Clausewitz goes on to state that “...superiority of numbers admittedly is the most important factor in the outcome of an engagement.”²⁸ This is likely why, according to Huntington, the military man’s mindset when estimating threats to the state clings to the adage, “...if he errs in his estimate, it should be on the side of overstating the threat.”²⁹

According to the National Military Strategy of the United States (NMS), the military’s “...foremost priority is the security of the American people, our territory, and our way of life.”³⁰ The external enemies of the state that most directly threaten the United States’ territory, people, and way of life are what the military exists to defend against. Ostensibly, those threats are manifest in the nuclear and conventional capabilities of other states. Deterring nuclear attack is

²⁶ Ibid., 69.

²⁷ Clausewitz, *On War*, 193.

²⁸ Ibid., 194.

²⁹ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 66.

³⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011: Redefining America’s Leadership* (Washington D.C., 2011), 1.

the focus of our nuclear weapons program,³¹ which can be summed up as maintaining second strike capability, safeguarding our nuclear arsenal, and maintaining a hedge against geopolitical uncertainty.³² While this is a major component of our defense strategy, it is relatively obscure in that it exists as a mission only to U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) in its role as the Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike³³; nuclear deterrence will therefore not be addressed in this paper. The remainder of the force is designed to fight against mostly conventional threats using conventional means. How best to employ that portion of the force against non-nuclear foes is the crux of the analysis in this monograph.

This paper has already established Huntington's theory behind why the military desires a large, capable extant force to defend against external threats. What Huntington does not address well, is how the military determines the capabilities required to counter insurgencies in foreign countries that are ostensibly of minimal threat to the existential being of the United States. Since insurgent threats to the United States are not the purview of the military; to wit, The Posse Comitatus Act forbids the use of the Army or Air Force to enforce the laws of the United States except under strict circumstances.³⁴ The expertise to identify and deal with those types of internal

³¹ *The National Military Strategy*, 7.

³² *Ibid.*, 19.

³³ USSTRATCOM website http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/JFCC_-_Global_Strike/ (accessed 9 January 2012); for further clarification see <http://www.stratcom.mil/history/> and <http://www.stratcom.mil/mission/>.

³⁴ *The Posse Comitatus Act*, Title 18 § 1385 (accessed online at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode18/usc_sec_18_00001385----000-.html on 9 January 2012).

threats to the homeland are resident in other agencies, such as the Department of Justice³⁵ and the Department of Homeland Defense.³⁶

Paradoxically, however, the United States military whose primary focus is conventional threats is the force of choice for fighting and assisting partner nations in fighting insurgencies and conducting counter insurgency (COIN) operations. Arguably then, since nuclear strike is the purview of USSTRATCOM and the expertise and authority for domestic security lies outside the Department of Defense, the average military officer is first and foremost raised and trained to identify, define, and counter conventional threats that originate from hostile states. The buffer the military strives to maintain to ensure the security of the United States then, is primarily designed against conventional, state-to-state threats. An obvious dilemma then emerges if the buffer required to conduct COIN is not the same type of buffer required for a large conventional fight. In COIN and steady-state operations across the globe, less overt military presence in the form of large formations of infantry, tanks, and artillery; and more unobtrusive presence in the form of small infantry-centric formations, military advisors, and intelligence *might* provide a more effective buffer.

Finally, whereas failure is not an option in a large conventional fight characterized by phases II (Seize Initiative) and III (Dominate) of the current phasing paradigm; in the phases characterized by softer power, 0 (Shape), I (Deter), IV (Stabilize), and V (Enable Civil

³⁵ The Department of Justice mission is: To enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States according to the law; to ensure public safety against threats foreign and domestic; to provide federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime; to seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior; and to ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans. (accessed online at <http://www.justice.gov/about/about.html> on 9 January 2012).

³⁶ The Department of Homeland Security mission is: To ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards. Our efforts are supported by an ever-expanding set of partners. Every day, the more than 230,000 men and women of the Department contribute their skills and experiences to this important mission. Our duties are wide-ranging, but our goal is clear: a safer, more secure America. (accessed online at <http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/responsibilities.shtm> on 9 January 2012).

Authority)³⁷, complete success is often not an option. This is because the implied and explicit connotations of phases II and III require a fairly rigid definition of tactical and operational success in order to progress to the next phase while those of phases 0, I, IV, and V rely on less rigid strategic definitions of success.

For phase II, *JP 5-0*, states that the conditions for success include “forcing the adversary to offensive culmination... and gain[ing] access to theater infrastructure... to expand friendly freedom of action.”³⁸ Phase III defines success differently in terms of conventional and irregular threats. For conventional threats success “concludes with decisive operations that drive an adversary to culmination and achieve[s] the JFC’s operational objectives,” and against irregular threats success occurs when friendly forces are “dominating and controlling the operational environment.”³⁹ While the objectives for these phases have strategic implications, in and of themselves they are mainly tactical and operational. Further, the major actions associated with these phases are about direct control; they are necessarily tactical, measureable, and terrain/enemy oriented; in short, they lend themselves to binary definitions of success. Either the enemy has or has not culminated; either friendly forces have or have not gained access to sufficient theater infrastructure to rapidly flow forces into theater; and either friendly forces have or have not achieved control over the operational environment.

For phases 0, I, IV, and V success is less rigidly defined. For those phases, the objectives are “to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies,”⁴⁰ “to deter undesirable adversary action by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve

³⁷ _____, *JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2011), III-42 to III-43.

³⁸ Ibid., III-42-43.

³⁹ Ibid., III-43.

⁴⁰ Ibid., III-42.

of the joint force,”⁴¹ “to help move a host nation from instability... to increased stability,”⁴² and “to enable the viability of the civil authority and its provision of essential services to the largest number of people in the region,”⁴³ respectively. The objectives and success conditions for these phases are strategic in and of themselves. Success in attaining those conditions is defined not by concrete, tactical conditions; rather by the level of comfort or normality the commander feels in terms of how dissuaded or deterred adversaries are, how assured allies are, how stable the host nation is, and whether the civil authority is able to provide a reasonable degree of essential services to its people. With no concrete measuring stick for success in phases 0 and I, senior military leaders revert to Huntington’s risk-averse paradigm consisting of a predilection for a large extant force – if some military forces can deter and dissuade adversaries while assuring allies, then more must be better. Similarly, phases IV and V does not present clear linkages between tactical and strategic objectives making measuring sticks for progress ambiguous at best. In the absence of clear guidance and obvious metrics, military leaders are likely to compare the environment to what they are used to – Western ideals and definitions of a stable, functioning government, namely Western democracy.

Military leaders are programmed to achieve complete success in phases II and III. Those same leaders must recognize that there are degrees of success for the other phases which may equate to giving civilian leaders maximum flexibility to define a satisfactory outcome. It would be paradoxical and absurd to expect that officers raised and trained to achieve complete success in a conventional fight can easily and smoothly transition their approach to the paradigm of compromised success characteristic of the later phases of a campaign. Equally absurd would be to assume that those who established their careers by imposing U.S. will through large-scale

⁴¹ Ibid., III-42.

⁴² Ibid., III-43.

⁴³ Ibid., III-44.

operations to break the enemy in phases II and III, would embrace the strategy of long wars in phases IV and V that end in compromised and negotiated settlements.

The senior leader that recognizes and embraces this paradox is a fish swimming up stream. As postulated by Huntington, the military system rewards cooperation and groupthink; “[t]he military ethic is basically cooperative in spirit. It is fundamentally anti-individualistic.”⁴⁴ Acting individually and going against the grain is not a rewarded trait. The ability to successfully progress through a system that frowns upon such behavior for a 30+ year career is difficult at best.

Section C. Where you stand depends on where you sat

The age long debate over the prominence of nature (innate behavior) versus nurture (learned behavior) continues to consume countless research and discussion hours, however, virtually all can agree that past experiences play an important role in current and future actions of all people. Sun Tzu said “that one who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements. One who does not know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes be victorious, sometimes meet with defeat. One who knows neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated in every engagement.”⁴⁵ If one accepts this as a truism, then it logically follows that military officers, particularly senior leaders, should invest a good bit of time and energy into knowing themselves first; before trying to know and define the enemy. The intent of this section is to separate what is innate from what is learned; to outline the constraints and biases that make it difficult to know ourselves; and to define and predict rational behavior on the part of others.

⁴⁴ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 64.

⁴⁵ Sawyer, Ralph D., *Art of War* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1994), 179.

Innate versus Learned

Western traits that the popular imagination might treat as innate are actually quite the opposite. They are learned behaviors that constrain our activities, actions, and decisions. If we assume that individuals and organizations act rationally, then knowing ourselves largely defines what is rational to us. Similarly, it defines what we see as rational for others. These learned Western traits contribute to a failure to adequately predict our enemies' behavior and then to quickly attribute irrational behavior to account for enemy actions. The answer to knowing the enemy is better understood as knowing ourselves. By knowing ourselves, we can better understand the enemy.

Edward Said, coined the term “Orientalism” to identify a theory of the West behavior consisting of a “Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.”⁴⁶ His contention is that “without examining Orientalism,” the basis for Western dominance and intolerance of non-Westerns, “as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period.”⁴⁷ His theory goes on to identify the Western supposition of the “European identity as a superior one in comparison with all non-European peoples and cultures.”⁴⁸ In essence his theory is that the West so dominated the discourse between the West and the Orient, or more accurately the non-West, that it essentially defined them forever in the conscious and subconscious minds of Westerners *and* non-Westerners as inferior in just about every way imaginable. While there are many who disbelieve the theory in its entirety or chose to discount it, as a ready-made excuse for Orientals, particularly Islamic,

⁴⁶ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Random House, Inc., 1994), 3.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 7.

backwardness and self-pity, it has enough of a following and is sufficiently well-documented to make it a useful basis for Westerners to reflect on and to better understand themselves.⁴⁹

As Westerners, knowing ourselves begins by understanding that our perspective of others particularly the Orient begins as “...an idea that has a history and a tradition of thought, imagery, and vocabulary that have given it reality and presence in and for the West.”⁵⁰ It is difficult but not impossible to separate what we are (humans) from who we are (Westerners).

For a European or American studying the Orient there can be no disclaiming the main circumstances of *his* actuality: that he comes up against the Orient as a European or American first, as an individual second. And to be a European or American in such a situation is by no means an inert fact. It meant and means being aware, however dimly, that one belongs to a power with definite interests in the Orient, and more important, the one belongs to a part of the earth with a definite history of involvement in the Orient almost since the time of Homer.⁵¹

As outlined by Said in *Orientalism* below then, the judgments we make of non-Westerners; our way is right, theirs is wrong; then becomes not an innate fact, but a Western prejudice against others or Orientalism.

Orientalism is not a mere political subject matter or field that is reflected passively by culture scholarship, or institutions; nor is it a large and diffuse collection of texts about the Orient; nor is it representative and expressive of some nefarious “western” imperialist plot to hold down the “Oriental” world. It is rather a *distribution* of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts; it is an *elaboration* not only of a basic geographical distinction (the world is made up of two unequal halves, Orient and Occident) but also of a whole series of “interests” which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but also maintains; it *is*, rather than expresses, a certain *will* or *intention* to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) world; it is, above all, a discourse that is by no means in direct, corresponding relationship with political power in the raw, but rather is produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power, shaped to a degree by the exchange with power political (as with a colonial or imperial establishment), power intellectual (as with reigning sciences like comparative linguistics or anatomy, or any of the modern policy sciences), power cultural (as with orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, values), **power**

⁴⁹ Ibn Warraq, *Defending the West: A Critique of Edward Said's Orientalism* (New York: Prometheus Books, 2007), 18.

⁵⁰ Said, *Orientalism*, 5.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 11.

moral (as with ideas about what “we” do and what “they” cannot do or understand as “we” do [emphasis added]).⁵²

As Westerners, then, there is “...a profound difference between the will to understand for purposes of coexistence and humanistic enlargement of horizons, and the will to dominate for purposes of control and external enlargement of horizons, and the will to dominate for the purposes of control and external dominion.”⁵³

Cultural Constraints

The main idea is that “...because of Orientalism the Orient was not (and is not) a free subject of thought or action.”⁵⁴ Western actions are fundamentally predicated upon Western identity and how Westerners see the world vis-à-vis the Orient, or more accurately others, anyone who is not Western. Learned behavior, Western identity, guides our thoughts, our actions, our reactions; they are constraints to how we behave.

Our seemingly innate need to create existential crises, to control the environment, to control the enemy and our allies, and to emphasize Western definitions of honor all stem from constraints that are part of our Western and American culture. These constraints convince us that orthodox is right, modern is good, and the answer to Orientalism is Occidentalism.⁵⁵

The West’s “...self-identity thrives on existential crisis. Self-styled Westerners summon historic struggles in defining moments. The Alamo, the 1836 siege between Mexico and Texan rebels, was dubbed America’s Thermopylae.”⁵⁶ It is why Western media cannot get enough of the underdog. It is, incidentally, why the good news story does not play well in Western media.

⁵² Ibid., 12.

⁵³ Ibid., xix.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 3.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 328.

⁵⁶ Porter, *Military Orientalism*, 4.

“Conflicts with strange enemies, endlessly recalled and mythologized in art, literature, and film, help define the West’s cosmology.”⁵⁷

Control

“Major General Chiarelli described an ‘Arab and Iraqi culture’ grounded in ‘inherent corruption (by Western standards)’ and extreme concepts of ‘honour above all’, so that ‘lying’ to defend one’s honour is a cultural norm – something we, with our Western value set, cannot comprehend.”⁵⁸ It is why we “...historically preferred the direct battle fought without guile to smash the enemy, whereas the ‘Islamic’ way of war chose standoff weapons, deceit and attacking enemy cohesion.”⁵⁹ Western culture values Western honor, but cannot understand oriental definitions thereof. “It is a war formulated on supersized, global principles at the expense of local knowledge. It is a war declared on a tactical method rather than an identifiable group, for utopian rather than achievable goals, with little grasp of ends, ways, and means.”⁶⁰

The constraints that Western culture imposes – control; honor; the existential, tactical battle – upon Western leaders permeates senior leaders thoughts, their actions and the advice they give their superiors. It explains why rationality is relative and not absolute.

Rational versus Irrational Behavior

Understanding this is a key to understanding what it is to be a *Westerner*, and how *Westerners* see others. In *Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking*, Francois Jullien outlines the difference between the learned *Western* behavior to control the world around him or her versus the learned *Oriental* behavior to guide the behavior of the system towards an

⁵⁷ Ibid., 3.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 9.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 11.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 8.

acceptable outcome that is based not upon control but upon the potential inherent in a harmonious system. These differences in learned behavior form the cultural underpinnings of rationality.

From an *Oriental* perspective “America’s strategic failure, so the argument goes, springs from cognitive failure to understand foreign societies in Asia and the Middle East. Though its conventional military strength outguns its opponents, the US struggles to translate tactical battlefield supremacy into lasting political triumph.”⁶¹ Because of recent difficulties in the Western model, “Orientals appear not so much as inferior, but as sophisticates ready to confound the West and its witless impatience.”⁶² If we accept Francois Jullien’s hypothesis on the differences in how and the non-Westerners think, then from a non-Western perspective U.S. actions do not make sense. They are irrational as they generally go against the harmony inherent in the system.

Orientalism is a creation of the West as well as a definition of the West. It explains “[w]hat our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding... that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard so that ‘we’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow.”⁶³ Westernism then defines what is rational and what is not rational behavior. It imposes the constraints of occidental solutions to oriental problems; and keeps senior leaders from recommending oriental solutions to oriental problems to their superiors. It values control over enemies and allies more than maximizing the potential of the system. It defines what is and is not honorable. And lastly, it defines rationality and keeps us from seeing ourselves and our enemies clearly; it prevents us from the calm that comes before the results of each of those hundred battles Sun Tzu writes about.

⁶¹ Ibid., 7.

⁶² Ibid., 11.

⁶³ Ibid., xviii.

Section D. Personality Profile of Senior Leaders

This section will explore the personality profile of senior military leaders. This exploration will be based on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), a widely used psychological test that measures personality against strength of preference in four areas: Extraversion and Introversion (E-I), Sensing and Intuition (S-N), Thinking and Feeling (T-F), and Judging and Perceiving (J-P). The basic output of the test for an individual is a binary outcome for each of the four areas that results in one of 16 different personality types. Detailed test results indicate the strength of preference in each area as well. For the purposes of this study strength of preference unnecessarily complicates the analysis, so only the basic output will be looked at.

Extraversion and Introversion (**E-I**) measure where a person prefers to focus their attention and where they derive their energy from. People who prefer Extraversion focus outward, while people with Introversion preferences focus on their own inner world of ideas and experiences. Extraversion refers to people that direct their energy outward while drawing energy from interaction with people and from talking; introversion refers to those who direct their energy inward and receive energy from reflection.⁶⁴

Sensing and Intuition (**S-N**) measure the way a person prefers to receive information. A person who prefers Sensing likes real and concrete information; they are concerned with specifics and practical realities about what is happening around them. People who prefer Intuition like to take information in the form of the entire picture; they are concerned with relationships and connections among pieces of data and process patterns.⁶⁵

Thinking and Feeling (**T-F**) refer to how people prefer to make decisions. Thinking people like to make decisions objectively based primarily on logic and analysis; they make

⁶⁴ Isabel Briggs Myers, *Introduction to Type: A Guide to Understanding Your Results on the MBTI Instrument* (California, CPP Inc., 1998), 8-9.

⁶⁵ Myers, *Introduction to Type*, 8-9.

decisions based on facts and principles. Feeling people make decisions based on how the decision affects people. They make decisions more subjectively, putting themselves in the positions of those people (themselves and others) who are impacted by the decision.⁶⁶

Judging and Perceiving (**J-P**) refer to how a person orients themselves to the world around them; do they judge what is going on or do they perceive it. Judging people like order. They like to regulate the world around them and get things done. Perceiving people like flexibility. They see plans as constraining and prefer to experience life rather than regulate and order it; they are highly adaptive to changing situations and comfortable with unforeseen outcomes.⁶⁷

A compilation of characteristics frequently associate with each type are shown in the figure below.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 8 and 10.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 8 and 10.

ISTJ Quiet, serious, earn success by thoroughness and dependability. Practical, matter-of-fact, realistic, and responsible. Decide logically what should be done and work toward it steadily, regardless of distractions. Take pleasure in making everything orderly and organized – their work, their home, their life. Value traditions and loyalty.	ISFJ Quiet, friendly, responsible, and conscientious. Committed and steady in meeting their obligations. Thorough, painstaking, and accurate. Loyal, considerate, notice and remember specifics about people who are important to them, concerned with how others feel. Strive to create an orderly and harmonious environment at work and at home.	INFJ Seek meaning and connection in ideas, relationships, and material possessions. Want to understand what motivates people and are insightful about others. Conscientious and committed to their firm values. Develop a clear vision about how best to serve the common good. Organized and decisive in implementing their vision.	INTJ Have original minds and great drive, form implementing their ideas and achieving their goals. Quickly see patterns in external events and develop long-range explanatory perspectives. When committed, organize a job and carry it through. Skeptical and independent, have high standards of competence and performance – for themselves and others.
ISTP Tolerant and flexible, quiet observers until a problem appears, then act quickly to find workable solutions. Analyze what makes things work and readily get through large amounts of data to isolate the core of practical problems. Interested in cause and effect, organize facts using logical principles, value efficiency.	ISFP Quiet, friendly, sensitive, and kind. Enjoy the present moment, what's going on around them. Like to have their own space and to work within their own time frame. Loyal and committed to their values and to people who are important to them. Dislike disagreements and conflicts, do not force their opinions or values on others.	INFP Idealistic, loyal to their values and to people who are important to them. Want an external life that is congruent with their values. Curious, quick to see possibilities, can be catalysts for implementing ideas. Seek to understand people and to help them fulfill their potential. Adaptable, flexible, and accepting unless a value is threatened.	INTP Seek to develop logical explanations for everything that interests them. Theoretical and abstract, interested more in ideas than in social interaction. Quiet, contained, flexible, and adaptable. Have unusual ability to focus in depth to solve problems in their area of interest. Skeptical, sometimes critical, always analytical.
ESTP Flexible and tolerant, they take a pragmatic approach focused on immediate results. Theories and conceptual explanations bore them – they want act energetically to solve the problem. Focus on the here-and-now, spontaneous, enjoy the moment that they can be active with others. Enjoy material comforts and style. Learn best through doing.	ESFP Outgoing, friendly, and accepting. Exuberant lovers of life, people, and material comforts. Enjoy working with other to make things happen. Bring common sense and a realistic approach to their work, and make work fun. Flexible and spontaneous, adapt readily to new people and environments. Learn best by trying a new skill with other people.	ENFP Warmly enthusiastic and imaginative. See life as full of possibilities. Make connections between events and information very quickly, and confidently proceed based on patterns they see. Want a lot of affirmation from others, and readily give appreciation and support. Spontaneous and flexible, often rely on their ability to improvise and their verbal fluency.	ENTP Quick, ingenious, stimulating, alerts, and outspoken. Resourceful in solving new and challenging problems. Adept at generating conceptual possibilities and then analyzing them strategically. Good at reading other people. Bored by routine, will seldom do the same thing the same way, apt to turn to one new interest after another.
ESTJ Practical, realistic, mater-of fact. Decisive, quickly move to implement decisions. Organize projects and people to get things done, focus on getting results in the most efficient way possible. Take care of routine details. Have a clear set of logical standards, systematically follow them and want others to also. Forceful in implementing their plans.	ESFJ Warmhearted, conscientious, and cooperative. Want harmony in their environment, work with determination to establish it. Like to work with others to complete tasks accurately and on time. Loyal, follow through even in small matters. Notice what others need in their day-by-day lives and try to provide it. Want to be appreciated for who they are and for what they contribute.	ENFJ Warm, empathetic, responsive, and responsible. Highly attuned to the emotions, needs, and motivations of others. Find potential in everyone, want to help others fulfill their potential. May act as catalysts for individual and group growth. Loyal, responsive to praise and criticism. Sociable, facilitate others in a group, and provide inspiring leadership	ENTJ Frank, decisive, assume leadership readily. Quickly see illogical and inefficient procedures and policies, develop and implement comprehensive systems to solve organizational problems. Enjoy long-term planning and goal setting. Usually well informed, well read, enjoy expanding their knowledge and passing it on to others. Forceful in presenting their ideas.

Figure 1: Characteristics Frequently Associated with Each Type⁶⁸

⁶⁸ Ibid., 13.

“The frequency of the four preference scales can be estimated for the general population: E (75%) versus I (25%); S (75%) versus N (25%); T (50%) versus F (50%); and J (50%) versus P (50%).”⁶⁹ This correlates to the MBTI distribution for the general population shown in the figure below.

ISTJ (4.6875%)	ISFJ (4.6875%)	INFJ (1.5625%)	INTJ (1.5625%)
ISTP (4.6875%)	ISFP (4.6875%)	INFP (4.6875%)	INTP (1.5625%)
ESTP (14.0625%)	ESFP (14.0625%)	ENFP (4.6875%)	ENTP (4.6875%)
ESTJ (14.0625%)	ESFJ (14.0625%)	ENFJ (4.6875%)	ENTJ (4.6875%)

Figure 2: MBTI Distribution for General Population⁷⁰

According to Moraski, “[w]hen comparing leadership to personality types, the highest percentage of leaders falls into one of the Four Corners,”⁷¹ as demonstrated by the bold letters in the figure below. Further, “...the Four Corners make up 70 percent at the middle management level, 73 percent at the upper management level, and 85 percent at the executive level. At top levels of military and civilian organizations, the personality types are overwhelmingly TJ with 95 percent Thinking and 87 percent Judging. The remaining 5 percent are Feelers, and 13 percent are Perceivers.” At the executive level, where 85 percent are TJ, only about 15 percent of civilian and military leaders have types NOT associated with TJ (TP, FJ, and FP). Compare this with the

⁶⁹ Samuel F. Hatfield Jr., “Psychological Type: An Assessment and Applications for Senior Air Force Leadership” (Master’s Thesis, Air War College, 1988), 2.

⁷⁰ This table is derived from the MBTI frequency of E (75%) versus I (25%); S (75%) versus N (25%); T (50%) versus F (50%); and J (50%) versus P (50%) cited in footnote #69.

⁷¹ Jane M. Moraski, “Leadership: The Personality Factor” (Master’s thesis, United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2001), 29.

average distribution, where TJ, TP, FJ, and FP are evenly distributed at 25 percent of the population each.

ISTJ	ISFJ	INFJ	INTJ
ISTP	ISFP	INFP	INTP
ESTP	ESFP	ENFP	ENTP
ESTJ	ESFJ	ENFJ	ENTJ

Figure 3: Predominant Leadership Personality Types (CGSC/Middle Managers)⁷²

According to Myers, the TJ type is defined as Logical Decision Maker and is associated with “[a]nalytical decisive leaders,”⁷³ leaders who make decisions based on principles and processes and who are rigorous implementers of their decisions and visions. You might think these are exactly the type of leaders we want; it is why we are successful. Consider, however, the fact that a minute proportion of military leaders are TP (Adaptable Problem Solvers), FP (Supportive Coaches), and FJ (Values-Based Decision Makers). The most striking attributes that are virtually absent in senior military leaders, according to Myers’ analysis include adaptable, flexible, inspirational, and warm.⁷⁴ In an occupation that is in all aspects a team sport, it is astonishing that our senior leaders do not exhibit the attributes many associate with effective teambuilding such as empathy, innovation, and mental agility.⁷⁵

Further refining the data shows that by ignoring I and E, a preponderance of senior leaders are STJ. Dr. David Campbell from the Center for Creative Leadership noted in a lecture to the American Psychological Association that in a study he conducted STJ accounted for 56% of

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Myers, *Introduction to Type*, 34.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 34.

⁷⁵ _____, *FM 6-22, Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2006).

his sample of 161 Army Brigadier Generals.⁷⁶ While overall, "...the ISTJs and ESTJs... are good organizers and take-charge leaders who provide an efficient and orderly system. ...[C]ertain weaknesses of these types present implications for future leadership of the Air Force in both command and staff positions during peacetime and during combat in the rapidly changing environment of future warfare... [T]wo of the major weaknesses of the ISTJs and ESTJs are a resistance to change and risk aversion. These two characteristics may preclude being innovative to adapt to the changing environment."⁷⁷ This is corroborated in Vandergriff's paper "Creating the Officer Corps of the Future to Execute Force XXI Blitzkrieg" where he determines that leaders who are predominantly STJ "...have a preference for stability and avoiding organizational conflict. In other words, they tend to be bureaucrats, with a 'don't-rock-the boat attitude.'"⁷⁸

Chapter 3: Senior Military Leader Profile: Analysis and Recommendations

The previous chapter examined several predominant aspects that helped determine the characteristics of senior military leaders. While there is no such thing as an average person, much less an average senior military leader, the general traits and characteristics of senior military leaders identified in this chapter are sufficient to paint a picture of the culture, background, and personalities that make up a large proportion of those leaders. Based on a study of those characteristics it is useful to develop a tentative profile of the "average" senior military leader. This profile has utility because it identifies the cultural subtext that defines senior military leaders in America's armed forces, and provides a start point for analyzing how and why they make the

⁷⁶ David Campbell, "The Psychological Test Profiles of Brigadier Generals: Warmongers or Decisive Warriors?" (presentation at American Psychological Association Convention, New York City, 30 August 1987), 11-12.

⁷⁷ Hatfield, "Psychological Type: An Assessment and Applications for Senior Air Force Leadership," 15-16.

⁷⁸ Donald E Vandergriff, "Creating the Officer Corps of the Future to Execute Force XXI Blitzkrieg" (Armor, March 1, 1997, 29) <http://www.proquest.com/lumen.cgsccarl.com> (accessed December 6, 2011), 29.

decisions they make and give the advice they give. The profile suggested by the analysis in this chapter is depicted in the diagram below.

1. Physical
 - Age: 50+
 - Sex: male
 - Race: Caucasian
2. Experience
 - “Core” service professional (combat arms, fighter/bomber pilot, surface warfare officer, etc.)
 - Successful tactical leader with many years of experience in tactical-level units and as tactical-unit leaders
 - Limited-moderate experience at operational and strategic levels
3. Military Mindset
 - Feels a profound responsibility to provide for the security of the state
 - Stresses existing risks to the state and emphasizes and magnifies the immediacy of those threats
 - Favor an overwhelmingly strong, extant military capability
 - Risk averse; inflates the capabilities of enemies; overstates requirement for United States military capability
 - Rigidly seeks to attain overwhelming mission success; failure to accomplish a given mission is equivalent to complete failure; uncomfortable with the concept of compromises to mission success
4. Western Mindset
 - Orientalist: sees non-western cultures as inferior; wants to dominate and control the actions on non-westerners
 - Thrives on existential crises (everything is an emergency); identifies with the underdog
 - Seeks to control the situation; focuses on direct solutions
 - Rational behavior is defined by taking actions to control the environment; irrational behavior is inaction or action that does not seek control
5. Personality
 - MBTI profile: TJ; Logical Decision Maker; make decisions based on principles and processes; rigorous implementer of decisions and visions
 - Good organizer and take-charge leader who provide an efficient and orderly system
 - Avoids organizational conflict; works well within an established system or bureaucracy
 - Resistant to change and risk averse; prefers stability

Figure 4: Profile of Senior Military Leader

This profile supports the assertion that in general military senior leaders are conservative, risk averse, hegemonic, and tactical. Western and United States military culture are a product of a larger Western culture of Orientalism characterized by an overwhelming need for control and a cultural bias against all that is not Western which often results in flawed understanding of non-Western problems and leads to unsound strategies for campaigns in the Eastern Hemisphere. This culture affects how and why leaders think and act the way they do. For an example of how this personality might affect decisions, consider the following vignette. If asking advice on what forces a senior military leader wants on hand to fight or to assist in fighting an insurgency in Iraq, the military leader’s response is already, immediately biased towards the type of force required for conventional operations. If you ask a senior police officer what he thinks the force should

look like, you would likely get an answer that includes fewer military and many more blue-suited police officers; likewise if you asked a senior CIA executive you would likely get an intelligence collection-heavy force. Asking the same question to a senior Iraqi officer will undoubtedly result in a different answer; his cultural and developmental frame is different. He might adopt an answer that takes advantage of his strengths and the propensities of the system; he would likely try to control only what he absolutely had to and guide the outcomes of other things into a direction that while not ideal was “good enough” to meet his purposes. All solutions above are likely flawed; the question not asked is ostensibly the most important question – what solution is most likely to work over the long-term and within the cultural context of Iraq?

Section A. will analyze and test the hypothesis of the senior military leader profile above against two historic senior military leaders – Generals William C. Westmoreland and Richard G. Stilwell. The intent is to explore and validate the profile or parts thereof in an effort to increase understanding of why senior military leaders think and make the decisions the way they do. Since the profile is essentially a reflection of the hypothesis, validating the profile essentially validates the hypothesis.

Section B. will provide immediately applicable recommendations to senior leaders on how to mitigate the natural cultural and personal biases associated with the profile. It will not focus on long-term, institutional changes to correct any real or perceived senior leader shortfalls associated with the profile. The intent will be to provide practical recommendations that help senior leaders to conduct more open-minded analysis and make better, more holistic decisions.

Section A. Analysis

This section will analyze what the profile means. First and foremost, it is important to remain mindful of the Darwinian notion that the aforementioned profile traits emerged for a reason; the fittest traits survived and thrived after centuries of U.S. and Western military evolution. The profile of current officers is not an anachronism. It is the result of a long journey

that has provided the services and the nation with quality, competent senior officers. Still, the Darwinian precept that the past provides the clues to developing fittest specimens of the future may be flawed, thus it is worthwhile to analyze the profile within the context of the requirements of today's leaders and the emerging requirements of tomorrow's leaders. Through providing a subjective interpretation of the profile, this section will outline what a particular aspect of the profile might imply for a military leader in terms of outlook, mindset and behavior. This sections will also examine two leaders to test the hypothesis evident in the profile. General Westmoreland and General Stilwell will be used as subjects for the analysis and comparison with the profile. The subsequent sections will address each aspect of the profile: physical, experience, military mindset, Western mindset, and personality in sequence.

Physical

The major physical aspects of race, age, and sex have specific implications for senior leaders. Carla Kaplan contends that "...identity demands proper and unimpeded expression. It is a value, something we prize. This sense of identity as ours implies an immutable essence unchanged by physical development or external circumstances."⁷⁹ In short, the identity of a person strongly influences his behavior. One could hypothesize that a successful, elderly, white, male military officer will act in a certain way; likely somewhat differently from a successful, middle-aged, Hispanic, female military officer. In terms of race,

[i]n mainstream U.S. culture today, as in the past, the interests and values of white people are positioned as unmarked universals by which difference, deficit, truth, and justice are determined... Ethnographic studies... reveal that, when asked, most white will say that they have no racial identity culture, or advantages as whites; they are just "normal." This mindset reproduces white dominance by blaming people of color for failing to meet normative standards.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Carla Kaplan, "Identity," in *Keywords for American Cultural Studies*, edited by Bruce Burgett and Glen Hendler (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 123.

⁸⁰ Pamela Perry, "Identity," in *Keywords for American Cultural Studies*, edited by Bruce Burgett and Glen Hendler (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 244.

A thorough study of this demographic is beyond the scope of this monograph. Suffice it to say that the identity implications of a successful, elderly white male might imply an uncommon level of confidence and hubris touched with an air of cultural and individual superiority.

Heuristic evidence of this might be found in the behavior of General Westmoreland, a Caucasian male, who was 60 years of age when he assumed duties as the commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV), and was thus a perfect fit for the physical profile.⁸¹ An example of this exists in General Westmoreland's claim that American armed forces were never defeated and that military forces pulled out of Vietnam in conformance to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, which might serve as an example of the hubris of a man who bore the burden for the failed U.S. "search and destroy" strategy in Vietnam.⁸² General Stilwell fits the profiles similarly well, as a Caucasian male who assumed command of the United Nations Command in the Republic of Korea in 1973 at the age of 56.

Experience

As "core" service professionals, senior leaders in the military represent the culture, ethics, and spirit of their respective services. While it might be expected that they would exhibit a significant degree of parochialism, in fact, by the time they achieve four-star rank the opposite is quite true for those charged and empowered with joint force duties. Generals Eisenhower and Marshal have specific evidence that might characterize them as particularly non-service parochial. Specific actions might include their part in the reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff structures.⁸³ Further, Eisenhower's subsequent replacement and ostensibly firing of General Omar Bradley and the hiring of Admiral Arthur Radford as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

⁸¹ *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography*. s.v. "Westmoreland, William Childs."

⁸² *A Soldier Reports*, viii.

⁸³ Dale R. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 54-65.

Staff would support this as well.⁸⁴ While the Air Force and the Navy seemed particularly parochial during the post World War II years, General Myers and Admiral Mullen would seem to negate those earlier impressions.⁸⁵ Myers as a strong proponent for interagency reform,⁸⁶ and Mullen who as a naval officer served as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff oversaw a significant expansion of the nation's Army and Marine Corps and simultaneous decline in the end-strengths of the Navy and Air Force during a time of war.⁸⁷ It seems that Service parochialism might be tempered by extensive joint experience, responsibility, and maturity.

A strong bias towards tactical action is expected as the profile of senior officers confers a strong, almost overwhelming, tactical background. Taken in conjunction with the strong predominance of ISTJ and ESTJ personality types, this bias can become a characteristic that strongly inclines those leaders to focus on the concrete, here-and-now tactical problems instead of the indicators of emerging operational and strategic crises; or conversely a likewise focus on exploiting tactical success at the expense of emerging operational and strategic opportunities. A possibly compounding effect of this bias towards tactical action is a bias toward tactical, service-specific tactical action.

Extensive tactical experience implies limited to moderate operational and strategic experience which can hamper the performance of and encumber the success of otherwise

⁸⁴ Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush*, 93.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 90-93.

⁸⁶ Outlined in a summary of his book *Eyes on the Horizon : Serving in the Frontlines of National Security* available online at: <http://generalrichardmyers.com/book.html>, accessed 08 February 2012.

⁸⁷ 30 September 2001 the active Army Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force personnel strengths were 480,801; 377,810; 172,934; and 353,571 respectively (DoD Personnel and Procurement Statistics accessed online at <http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/rg0109.pdf> on 08 February 2012); respective totals on 31 December 2011 were 558,571; 322,629; 200,225; and 332,724 (DoD Personnel and Procurement Statistics accessed online at <http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/ms0.pdf> on 08 February 2012). These represent Army and Marine Corps growths of 77,770 and 27,291 respectively and Navy and Air Force declines of 55,181 and 20,847 respectively.

promising young general and flag grade officers. As joint assignments are largely broadening, operational and strategic assignments, the constraints Gold-Water Nichols places on services to produce joint qualified senior officers serves as a counterbalance to tactical service cultures. Additionally, by the time a general officer reaches three or four star ranks, his experience at the operational and strategic level is likely to be moderate to extensive as well as recent.

As with the physical characteristics of age and race, experience as a “core” professional implies a certain identity. One could expect senior military leaders with that background to be somewhat service parochial, with a particular bias towards tactical action. As a Colonel and one or two star general officer, these biases would likely be strongest. However, with increased progression and experience, one might expect those tactical and service biases to soften.

Looking at General Westmoreland again, he was commissioned in the Field Artillery upon graduation from West Point in 1936.⁸⁸ He served as a field artilleryman until his promotion to Brigadier General in 1952.⁸⁹ As a field artilleryman General Westmoreland served in numerous peace and wartime tactical positions to include field artillery battalion command, two infantry division chief of staff jobs, and command of three infantry regiments.⁹⁰ General Westmoreland had twelve years of experience as a general officer prior to assumption of command of the MACV.⁹¹ He also served as an instructor at the Army Command and General Staff College and the Army War College for three years.⁹² Key experiential duties as a general officer included five years of General staff experience, two years as a division commander, three years as superintendent of the United States Military Academy, and two years as a corps

⁸⁸ *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography*. s.v. “Westmoreland, William Childs.”

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

commander.⁹³ His background amounts to a reasonable fit in terms of service as a “core” service (Army) professional with extensive success and experience as a tactical leader. In terms of limited to moderate operational and strategic level experience upon promotion to General officer, the profile is again quite accurate. As noted above, however, by the time he assumed command of MACV as a four star general, his experience at those levels was significantly more extensive. As noted in the experience profile assessment above, however, his tactical biases likely had a large influence on him adopting the very tactical, and ultimately strategically ineffective, “search and destroy” strategy while commander of the MACV.

Looking at another strategic leader, General Richard Stilwell, we see another leader who fits the profile quite well. General Stilwell was commissioned in the Engineers upon graduation from the United States Military Academy in 1938.⁹⁴ He served as a combat engineer and in Division and Corps staff jobs throughout much of his time as a field grade officer in the United States prior to World War II and in Europe during World War II. After an assignment in the G-3 of the Theater General Board, Stilwell transferred to the infantry in November of 1945. He commanded the 15th Infantry Regiment of the 3rd Infantry Division in two Korean campaigns. At the time of his promotion to Brigadier General in May 1961, he had served seven years in operational and strategic staff positions as a Colonel after Regimental Command. As a General Officer Stilwell served as the Commandant of Cadets at West Point, the J-3 of the MACV in Vietnam, the Commander of the United States Assistance Command Thailand (MACTHAI), the Deputy Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, a provisional (later XXIV Corps) in Vietnam, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations in the Committee of the United Nations, and Commander of Sixth Army before assuming command of the United Nations Command /

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ “General Richard Giles Stilwell.” *General Orders No. 1*, 1.

Commanding General of Eighth United States Army in Korea as a four star General.⁹⁵ General Stilwell was the four-star U.S. commander in the Republic of Korea during the infamous 18 August 1976 tree felling incident where two American officers were killed by North Korean soldiers in the Joint Security Area while supervising a group of South Korean workmen and a joint security detail to trim a tree obstructed the view between guard posts.⁹⁶ Notwithstanding approval by President Ford and the strategic intent of the administration to reassert the United Nations Command's right of movement in the JSA⁹⁷, General Stilwell was the driving force behind the proposal to cut the entire tree down with an overwhelming military display of force.⁹⁸

Similar to General Westmoreland, General Stilwell's background amounts to a good fit in terms of service as a "core" service (Army) professional and experience as a tactical leader. In terms of operational and strategic level experience his experience begins earlier in his career; by the time he assumed command of force in Korea he had close to 21 years of experience at the operational and strategic levels. At this point in his career it might be expected that his tactical biases would be less acute than General Westmoreland's. As he did not write memoirs and not much is written about his experiences in war or otherwise, it is difficult to measure this assessment with any depth. However, his actions during the 18 August 1976 tree felling incident while quite tactical in execution, were by all indications highly successful military operations that achieved the strategic objectives of sending a strong message to North Korea.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ Ibid., 1-4.

⁹⁶ Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas* (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 2001), 74.

⁹⁷ Taeyoung Yoon, "Managing the Korean Crisis: A Case Study of the Panmunjom Axe Murder Incident of 1976," *Korean Observer* (Winter 2000), 639-658.

⁹⁸ Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, 78.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 78.

Military Mindset

The implications of a rigid military mindset are evident in both service and military parochialism. As the profile indicates Joint and service commanders can be expected to stress the nature of threats, and to recommend a strong military capability to deter and if necessary defeat those threats. Adversity to risk might be manifest in asking for a significantly greater capability than what is needed, thereby providing an inefficient solution that hampers government or military efforts in other arenas, while inflexibly seeking to attain overwhelming mission success in all phases of the operation might result in the ability to gain an earlier, better, longer lasting, and less costly (in blood and treasure) peace.

The military mindset of General Westmoreland can be analyzed in terms of his impression of himself, as expressed in his book *A Soldier Reports*. In it he continuously alludes to requirements to assist South Vietnam with additional U.S. involvement, particularly with air assets early on, but increasingly with troops on the ground; in fact he supports Ambassador Taylor's assertion that "Introducing American combat troops might result in the South Vietnamese letting the U.S.. 'carry the ball,' and denotes that "Something quite clearly had to be done to bolster the Vietnamese armed forces and people."¹⁰⁰ In fact, during General Westmoreland's tenure as commander, the MACV increased from 16,500 in June of 1964 to 534,700 in June of 1968,¹⁰¹ just a month before he was replaced by General Abrams.¹⁰² This occurred in a de facto civil war between two roughly equally-sized competitors where the Soviet Union and China generally provided only economic and indirect military assistance with only 3,000 Soviet military technicians actually assisting North Vietnam directly and the Chinese

¹⁰⁰ William C Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (New York: DaCapo Press Inc., 1989), 114,

¹⁰¹ Herring, *America's Longest War*, 182.

¹⁰² *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography*. s.v. "Westmoreland, William Childs."

assisting primarily through building infrastructure and providing military equipment.¹⁰³

Notwithstanding the fact that the North Vietnamese were the aggressors, General Westmoreland clearly thought the South Vietnamese were inferior in their ability to wage war against an enemy that was essentially kith and kin. Despite the fact they received only limited direct assistance by China and the Soviet Union General Westmoreland believed this so strongly that he increased U.S. personnel by over 3000%.¹⁰⁴ Arguably, maintaining the mission as assistance instead of leadership and direct involvement would have allowed, even forced, South Vietnam to fight the war in a somewhat asymmetrical manner, at least culturally.

As for his drive to achieve absolute success, in his forward to *A Soldier Reports* written in 1989 (the book was initially published in 1976), he claims American armed forces were never defeated and that military forces pulled out of Vietnam in conformance to the order of the Commander-in-Chief.¹⁰⁵ Here it is arguable that he viewed success rigidly in terms of military missions, namely “search and destroy,” versus in terms of graduated political outcomes. This is not just an assertion; General Westmoreland defended his “search and destroy” strategy in his memoirs on Vietnam when he states that “Although the Vietnamese appeared to understand the terms, many Americans apparently failed to comprehend ‘search and destroy,’ possibly because detractors of the war chose to distort it. Since it is the basic objective of military operations to seek and destroy the enemy and his military resources, I saw nothing contradictory or brutal about the term.”¹⁰⁶ Even though he acknowledged that Vietnam was not a conventional war, it is clear that for him, military success was couched mainly in terms of an ability to bring the enemy to decisive battle. In addition to narrowly defining success then, General Westmoreland, in

¹⁰³ Herring, *America's Longest War*, 146, 176-177.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 182.

¹⁰⁵ Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, viii.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 83.

contradiction to Clausewitz' warning not to, was guilty of trying to turn the war into something it was not.¹⁰⁷

In terms of assessment with regard to the profile outlined earlier, General Westmoreland's military mindset seems to be a markedly close match. Thirty-six years of service including combat time spent in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam clearly mark him as a man with a profound responsibility toward the security of the nation. His actions in increasing the force levels in Vietnam by over 500,000 troops over a period of four years imply he favored a large extant force, against an enemy that was inflated as an immediate and highly capable threat, especially in light of a fairly comparable extant South Vietnamese ally. Finally he admits a fairly rigid definition of success that is largely tactical, particularly when viewed in the light of his "search and destroy" strategy. The attributes of this profile were useful, maybe even essential for success in World War II, yet, arguably, they were somewhat detrimental to achieving success or even an early, negotiated peace in Vietnam.

Looking at General Stilwell's military mindset which is most evident in his writings and performance as a commander in Korea, we see a similar pattern. In an article he wrote regarding security in Korea after his retirement, he clearly feels a continuing responsibility to ensure the security of United States interests. In 1977 he responds to the assertion by Franklin Weinstein that 'Most analysts agree that the armed forces of South and North Korea are now, overall, in balance,' by accentuating the North Korean threat and vociferously defending continued U.S. troop presence on the peninsula.

¹⁰⁷ Clausewitz, *On War*, 88 – here Clausewitz says that "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and **commander**[emphasis added] have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive." General Westmoreland failed to appreciate the nature of the war; arguably, from his memoirs above, his tactical understanding of war drove his strategy rather than the reverse. Ostensibly, he failed to ask the supreme strategic question "what is the nature of the war," or just as likely he chose to ignore the obvious answer and simply blundered ahead.

[T]he hard facts are:

- North Korea outguns South Korea in every measurement of ready military power...
- North Korean armed forces are so positioned, and their counter-intelligence screen is so effective, that a three-dimensional attack could be launched on Seoul, twenty-five miles away, with no more than a few hours warning.
- The combination of interceptors, anti-aircraft guns, surface-to-air missiles and extraordinary hardening of facilities makes North Korea the toughest air defense environment outside the Soviet Union...
- Even the military capabilities of the U.S. ground and air forces in Korea today do not redress the imbalance.¹⁰⁸

He clearly stresses the existing risk of threats to U.S. interests in Korea and Japan. General Stilwell implies that his facts are the “real” facts, when indeed, the assertion by Weinstein that parity existed between North and South Korea in the 70’s was backed by strong facts as well: “estimates [of North Korean superiority in tanks] are misleading, he noted, because they fail to include air support as an antitank weapons. Besides, calculations of military balance must take into account nonmilitary factors, such as the economic base and population that favor the South.”¹⁰⁹

Particularly when looked at with the advantage of hindsight, Stilwell’s assertion that, “[i]f the U.S. withdraws its troops, unilaterally and without countervailing concessions from the North, likelihood of conflict (in which the U.S. would be immediately involved by reason of its Armistice responsibilities) soars. So the U.S. must stay the course,” confirms his position as a highly risk averse leader who strongly favors a highly capable extant U.S. military capability in South Korea. Stilwell further argues that “[t]he United States has unique responsibilities under the 1953 Armistice Agreement... There is no prospect for disengagement from these responsibilities.”¹¹⁰ In light of the stability of the Armistice security arrangement in Korea since

¹⁰⁸ Richard G. Stilwell, “The United States, Japan and the Security of Korea” (*International Security*, Vol 2, No. 2, Autumn 1977) <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2538727?origin=api> (accessed January 30, 2012), 93.

¹⁰⁹ Franklin B. Weinstein and Fuji Kamiya, *The Security of Korea* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), 28.

¹¹⁰ “The United States, Japan and the Security of Korea,” 95.

its inception in 1953, these statements represent a lionizing of North Korean capabilities and a rather rigid definition of success that only recognizes perceived U.S. responsibilities under the terms of the Armistice. There is no notion that success can be defined in any other way, nor that the United States define success in terms of the present or the future rather than the past.

Assessing General Stilwell's military mindset against the proposed profile produces a clearly close match. Similar to Westmoreland, thirty-eight years of service including combat time spent in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam clearly marked him as a man with a profound responsibility toward the security of the nation. His writings supporting maintaining troop strength in Korea signal that he favors a large extant force, against an ostensibly inflated enemy. Further, he admits to a rather rigid definition of success tied to the 1953 Armistice, which in light of recent troop reductions in Korea since 2004, arguably kept U.S. forces tied down on the Korean peninsula for many years longer than militarily necessary.

Western Mindset

The profile of Orientalism is well documented, and assumes a Western solution to most problems is the only correct solution. This bias, can lead to misreading non-Western conflicts and problems and lead to culturally unsuitable and socially unacceptable U.S. imposed prospective solutions. Further, biases towards control, particularly in the context of a culture where controlled outputs are not ubiquitous, might be futile, as the system is likely to fall apart when U.S. forces depart. In sum, Orientalist biases might lead to the imposition of inappropriate strategies for non-Western conflicts that are expensive and only seem to work while U.S. forces are present to monitor and ensure compliance.

Looking again at General Westmoreland, there is a bit of incongruity in the effort. Analyzing the strategic and cultural context purely at face value, we are in effect trying to confirm a paradox – that General Westmoreland, due to his military mindset, inflates the efficacy and capabilities of the Eastern enemy, North Vietnam, while at the same time, due to his Western

mindset, accentuates the backwardness and inferiority of his allies, South Vietnam, knowing all the while that both are cut from the same cloth. In order to simplify the analysis, the effort will focus on trying to prove three imperatives; first that General Westmoreland is a Westerner, second that he is an Orientalist, and third that he seeks to control rather than direct outcomes.

First, General Westmoreland is clearly a Westerner. He is Caucasian, his family had ties to Europe, as his ancestors emigrated from England in the 1600's;¹¹¹ his formal education from grade school through West Point was entirely in America;¹¹² and his pastimes, particularly scouts, during his formative years were Western innovations.¹¹³ While the state of being "Western" does not in and of itself make one an Orientalist, it implies Western cultural values and perspectives and is a good first step in the analysis as it indicates a Western predilection. However, the real proof, as they say, of the pudding is in the eating, or in this case in General Westmoreland's behavior and actions.

The second task, to demonstrate his Orientalist bent, then can be done through looking at his actions towards South Vietnam. Did he believe they were capable of defeating North Vietnam with minimal U.S. assistance as the Russians and Chinese behavior towards North Vietnam suggests or was direct U.S. intervention required? Did General Westmoreland look at them as equal partners? How did he view the division of labor between the U.S. and South Vietnam – who got the main effort or efforts? Answering these questions is a formidable task, and obviously open to opinion and selective interpretation of facts, statements, and higher guidance. Suffice it to say, that despite pressure from above to take the lead for pacification, General Westmoreland himself believed that the "... very logic of the [U.S.] military's handling pacification... would

¹¹¹ Samuel Zaffiri, *Westmoreland: A Biography of General William C. Westmoreland* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1994), 8.

¹¹² *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography*. s.v. "Westmoreland, William Childs."

¹¹³ Zaffiri, *Westmoreland: A Biography of General William C. Westmoreland*, 22.

eventually sell itself.”¹¹⁴ The tact for this monograph will not be to prove the positive, rather to find compelling evidence to the contrary – that General Westmoreland did NOT believe South Vietnam was capable of defeating North Vietnam alone; that the U.S. and Vietnam were not equal partners; and that the U.S. felt compelled to take the lead and control the war effort, particularly through direct solutions.

First, General Westmoreland pushed quite strenuously to get permission to bomb North Vietnam, and truly believed that direct U.S. intervention was required from the start. In *A Soldier Reports*, he states that “...I had maintained all along that success in the South had to accompany bombing in the North if conclusive results were to be expected.”¹¹⁵ As for ground troops, he was a strong proponent for increasing U.S. assistance, as evidenced by the expansion of the Army and Marine Corps presence from 9,900 and 600, respectively, at the assumption of his command over the MACV to 354,300 and 83,600, respectively, when he gave up command.¹¹⁶ Evidence of his mindset can be summed by what he said early in the war circa 1966, “I disagreed with the enclave strategy. As my staff study put it at the time, it represented ‘an inglorious, static use of U.S. forces in overpopulated areas with little chance of direct involvement or immediate impact on the outcome of events.’”¹¹⁷ This statement was the beginning of the U.S. campaign to take the fight to the enemy and, while not an absolute indictment of South Vietnamese ineptitude, is illustrative of the mindset that distrusted South Vietnam to defend themselves. His distrust is evident in his explanation of why he disliked the enclave strategy; namely because it ceded the initiative for the engagement of U.S. force to the South Vietnamese Army as it would “...leave the decision of when and where to strike the enemy...” to the ARVN.¹¹⁸ Further, he just did not want to get U.S.

¹¹⁴ Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, 210.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 126.

¹¹⁶ Herring, *America’s Longest War*, 182.

¹¹⁷ Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, 130.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 130.

troops embroiled in combat in “densely populated areas;” further emphasizing his inclination to discard Clausewitz’ advice and turn the war into something alien to its nature, namely the conventional campaign he wanted.

This leads to the second point regarding whether the U.S. and Vietnam were equal partners in the war. General Westmoreland himself stated that “A ground invasion of North Vietnam was out, for the U.S. national policy was not to conquer North Vietnam but to eliminate the insurgency inside South Vietnam.”¹¹⁹ Clearly General Westmoreland thought South Vietnamese policy was entirely secondary to U.S. policy in the war. In many ways this is quite natural, as General Westmoreland is a U.S. officer; however what is not so natural is the conspicuous absence of discussion throughout his biography of South Vietnam’s policy in the war, particularly when it comes to the expansion of the U.S. effort. Their acquiescence to U.S. leadership is either assumed or South Vietnamese leadership is simply discounted.¹²⁰ IN “Reflections on the Vietnam War,” General Cao Van Vien essentially confirms this when he regards the period of General Westmoreland’s presence in Vietnam as the “Americanization of the War: 1964-1967.”¹²¹

In fact, moving to point three, General Westmoreland makes note of U.S. preeminent leadership and authority in Vietnam when he states that “Although South Vietnamese leaders asked at first that I restrict American presence to remote areas, I declined, unwilling to see my flexibility fettered and also conscious that American performance would set an example and a challenge to the face-conscious Orientals.”¹²² General Westmoreland’s hubris and narrow-mindedness is difficult to overlook here. With this statement he basically implies that he knows

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 153.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 153.

¹²¹ Vien, “Reflections on the Vietnam War,” vii.

¹²² Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, 146.

what Vietnam needs better than the Vietnamese, who really are more concerned with saving face than with survival and winning the war. He considers their advice not as well-thought-out military input rather as the machinations of one who does not understand the necessities of a war for national survival which is interestingly over their national survival not his. General Cao Van Vien confirms this hubris in “Reflections on the Vietnam War” when he laments the “Americanization of the War:”

We believe that the U.S. objective during this period was overly predicated on the safeguarding of the American honor as a major world power guaranteeing the protection of a small ally, the belief that war could be ended shortly with U.S. military might, and the underestimation of the North Vietnamese leadership’s determination. All this resulted in the Americanization of the war and all priorities were given to the U.S. force buildup and conduct of the war in South Vietnam.

While this analysis has reasonably confirmed General Westmoreland as an Orientalist, it would be unfair not to mention that he admitted an enormous admiration for the individual bravery and tactical aptitude of many South Vietnamese leaders throughout his book *A Soldier Reports*. While this may damage the argument of General Westmoreland as an Orientalist, it is necessary to mention if for no other reason than to avoid slandering a great man as an outright bigot. He was not.

Finally, did General Westmoreland feel compelled to control his environment, and was he enamored of direct solutions? At the outset the answer points to yes simply by virtue of his status as a West Point alumni, one of the premier engineering schools in the country, and an artillery officer.¹²³ Further analysis confirms his desire to control through his actions in Vietnam. He saw the war as one of attrition,¹²⁴ something not natural to an insurgency which fundamentally is about the legitimacy of a government.¹²⁵ Further, his tenure of command in Vietnam is largely

¹²³ *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography*. s.v. “Westmoreland, William Childs.”

¹²⁴ Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, 153.

¹²⁵ _____, *FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency* (Washington D.C. Government Printing Office, 2006), para 1-2.

recognized as the time during which the Vietnam War was “Americanized.”¹²⁶ With the enormous resources at his disposal, General Westmoreland was unwilling to allow the Vietnamese to fight their own fight. He might have been wise to reflect on T.E. Lawrence’s advice: “Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.”¹²⁷ Perhaps Lawrence’s resource constraints allowed him the freedom to innovate and think unconventionally, whereas General Westmoreland’s abundance of resources constrained his thinking – he had a hammer and was looking for nails. In any event, instead of focusing on the underlying problem, something he could not control, General Westmoreland focused his efforts on something he could – enemy body count through his “search and destroy” strategy, to wit, “In a war without front line and territorial objectives, where ‘attriting the enemy’ was the major goal, the ‘body count’ became the index of progress.”¹²⁸ Finally, it is worth noting that Westmoreland’s Army strategy was largely recognized as one of “fight[ing] the guerillas by staging decisive battles;”¹²⁹ a clear indication of his preference for a direct solution to the Vietnam War. A counterargument to this would postulate that General Westmoreland created the “search and destroy” strategy as a response to Washington being enamored with the “body count” metric, a term that General Westmoreland abhorred.¹³⁰ However, if this is to be believed, it implies that Westmoreland was the lapdog for a war run from Washington, something which General Westmoreland’s autobiography does not support and which is clearly beyond the scope of this monograph.

While Western Mindset and behavior as an Orientalist are difficult to prove, this section has reasonably demonstrated that General Westmoreland had a tendency towards such a mindset

¹²⁶ Herring, *America’s Longest War*, 179-191.

¹²⁷ T.E. Lawrence, “Twenty-seven Articles,” *Arab Bulletin* (20 August 1917), Article 15.

¹²⁸ Herring, *America’s Longest War*, 186.

¹²⁹ William Head and Lawrence E. Grinter, *Looking Back on the Vietnam War: A 1990s Perspective on the Decisions, Combat, and Legacies* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1993), 82.

¹³⁰ Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, 273.

and that his actions confirm those predilections. Further, the analysis supports the assertion that a Western mindset can be detrimental to achieving lasting, workable solution in non-Western cultures. Arguably, this was never realized by General Westmoreland and was the failing of a great leader. He simply could not grasp that the South Vietnamese people could or even should fight the North without U.S. leadership. Ultimately, this realization occurred with the Vietnamization of the war after popular support for the war had already force a U.S. withdrawal.

The analysis for General Stilwell will apply the same three imperatives used to analyze General Westmoreland – establishing General Stilwell as a Westerner, fascinated with control, and an Orientalist. General Stilwell was a Westerner. He was Caucasian with an unremarkable childhood in Buffalo, New York, and was a West Point Graduate.¹³¹ His relatively mundane upbringing in Western society suggests he had a quite Western outlook.

His performance as the commander in Korea during the infamous “tree felling” incident suggests that he seeks control and is prone to the Western impulse to recreate the Alamo or Thermopylae. Even with the backdrop of the United States’ strategic interest to “reestablish UNC rights of movement throughout the entire JSA [Joint Security Area],” while demonstrating UNC resolve,¹³² General Stilwell’s decision to turn the U.S. reaction into a showdown between the U.S. and North Korea by using “a mighty array of forces appropriate to the initiation of World War III”¹³³ is indicative of the Western predilection for creating existential crises from non-existential conditions. Those actions also served to demonstrate an instinctive Western tendency to grasp at control. The South Korean reaction to the incident proposed by President Park, while strong, was very different. He advocated “(1) ‘the strongest possible protest’ to Pyongyang, including demands for an apology, reparation, and guarantees against repetition, all of which he admitted

¹³¹ “General Richard Giles Stilwell.” *General Orders No. 1*, 1.

¹³² Jeffery Miller, “A Story of the Panmunjom Axe Murder,” *Korea Observer* (Autumn 2001), 479.

¹³³ Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, 81.

were not likely to be forth coming; and (2) ‘appropriate counteraction’ by military force to teach North Korea a lesson, but without the use of firearms.”¹³⁴ While South Korea did support the U.S. reaction with ROK Special Forces,¹³⁵ their proposed response was clearly less confrontational and indicative of a non-Western response to provocation.

Evidence of General Stilwell as an Orientalist is less forthcoming. His exposure to Asia, Vietnam and Korea, suggests an opportunity to embrace foreign cultures. His report to the Secretary of the Army on “Army Activities in Underdeveloped Areas Short of Declared War,” suggests a less-than conventional approach to warfare and an acceptance toward developing U.S. Army force to train and educate Asian forces to fight their own fights. While not a panacea, there is good reason to believe him moderate as opposed to radically Orientalist.

An overall assessment of General Stilwell’s Western mindset indicates that he fits the paradigm. While not a perfect match in all categories, he is clearly Western, has a strong propensity for control, and displays a moderate (less than overwhelming) degree of Orientalism. Possibly, the emergence of the ROK as a modern, well-functioning democracy with a strong military refutes the assertion that Western solutions lack efficacy in non-Western cultures. However, before we completely discount the assertion, it is instructive to mention that the ROK wanted U.S. assistance to counter the threat of North Korea and while their society is modern, it is still clearly non-Western. The U.S. did not turn Korea into something foreign to its nature, the ROK made Korea, with U.S. assistance and leadership, into what it is today. The solutions were embrace by the ROK rather than forced on them.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 80.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 80.

Personality

Most leaders fit the MBTI profile of –TJ, with the majority of those being –STJs (versus –NTJs). The major characteristics associated with the TJ profile was outlined in the analysis from chapter 2, as a logical thinker, with the –NTJs having a proclivity for theory, logic and reason and the –STJs having an inclination for facts, practical information, and for applying objective analysis and experience to the world around them.¹³⁶ All are good organizers and take charge leaders who rigorously implement decisions and like to establish and implement efficient and orderly systems. They function well in established bureaucracies, but are resistant to change, avoid organizational conflict, and are somewhat risk averse. The –NTJs tend to be a bit more innovative than their –STJ counterparts. The MBTI attributes that are generally absent from –NTJs and –STJs include creativity, curiosity about change, personal warmth and concern for others, empathy and accommodation of others' wants and needs, and spontaneity, the characteristics often associated with good coaches, and adaptable problem solvers.¹³⁷ The implications of this profile might be that while senior leaders are likely to make logical, efficient, decisions, they also tend to make those decisions logically versus empathetically, autocratically versus consensually, and unoriginally versus innovatively. While this analysis may appear to be an indictment of how the military makes and implements decisions, it is not. The aforementioned characteristics are likely exactly what is needed in most situations requiring a senior leader decision. The point of the analysis is to reveal the senior leader preference for processing information and taking action; to help the senior leader know himself better. Comparing the profile above with General Westmoreland will help elucidate the effects of the MBTI analysis.

There are four primary indicators in the profile. First is logical decision-maker, followed by penchant for organization, then talent for working within an orderly system, and finally

¹³⁶ Myers, *Introduction to Type*, 35 and 37.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 30-34.

resistance to change and risk averseness. These indicators will be analyzed against General Westmoreland's demonstrated personality in the aforementioned order.

First, by all accounts General Westmoreland was a logical decision-maker. He was a man guided by a personal code who gravitated towards organizations that shared his principled code – church, scouts, the Citadel, West Point, and the military.¹³⁸ Throughout his book *A Soldier Reports*, he references guiding principles, for example he states that “[a]n officer corps, my West Point education emphasized, must have a code of ethics that tolerates no lying, no cheating, no stealing, no immorality, no killing other than that recognized under international rules of war and essential for the military victory.”¹³⁹ Further, in the first paragraph of the preface he makes a point of emphasizing what he accepts as the rules and principles under which military men serve their country, remarking that “[t]he freedom to speak out in the manner of a private citizen, journalist, politician, legislator has no part in the assignment,” whether it be “as enlisted man, junior officer, battalion commander, division commander, even field commander in time of war.”¹⁴⁰ Second, General Westmoreland was a good organizer and an obvious take charge individual. He took charge of the Vietnam War effort with élan and was credited with increasing the troop strength to over 500,000 military personnel in support of his “search and destroy” strategy.¹⁴¹ Ostensibly he was chosen as Chief of Staff of the Army in 1968 precisely for his ability to organize and execute. In *A Soldier Reports*, he acknowledges reorganization of the Army as one of his top two priorities, and very quickly and methodically outlines the major tenets of his plan characterized by the Four M's of *Mission, Motivation, Modernization*, and

¹³⁸ Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, 10.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, xi.

¹⁴¹ Edward J. Lee, and H.C. Haynesworth, *Nixon, Ford, and the Abandonment of South Vietnam* (Jefferson, NC: MacFarland and Company Inc., 2002), 5 and 11.

Management.¹⁴² Third, General Westmoreland was a bureaucrat. He was often criticized for his talents and inclination for administration, McGeorge Bundy in fact characterized him as a “regulation officer” and suggested that he was “running operations in Vietnam ‘in a regulation way’ with ‘too much staff, too much administration, too much clerical work, too much reporting, too much rotation, and not enough action.’”¹⁴³ Finally, regarding resistance to change and averseness to risk, the preceding analysis regarding his plan to reorganize the Army for the future along the four M’s might indicate a desire for change and even innovative behavior. The reality however is that while his plan was one predicated on reorganization, it is more accurately depicted as an effort to “revitalize” the Army along traditional lines of effort while integrating incremental technological improvements.¹⁴⁴ By all accounts, his own included, General Westmoreland was a man who valued the stability associated with a principled life that reflect the solid foundations of his youth as a scout and a West Point graduate.¹⁴⁵

While difficult to conduct a purely objective assessment of General Westmoreland’s personality without test data, the historic evidence, including his personal biography, indicate a personality that is strongly correlated with the proposed personality profile of this monograph. These characteristics likely contributed to General Westmoreland’s actions during the Vietnam War. In his attempt to make sense of the Vietnam War, he tried to mold it into something logical; something he was familiar with – World War II Europe and Korea. Yet as a Maoist-based Guerilla war, the style of war General Westmoreland was fighting was foreign to its nature. Unlike the Vietnamese who “...must have learned a lesson from the Korean War.... [North

¹⁴² Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, 364.

¹⁴³ H. R. McMaster, *Derelection of Duty : Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 1997), 207-208.

¹⁴⁴ General Westmoreland uses the word “revitalize” in the verbiage regarding his intent to prepare the Army for the future on page 364 of *A Soldier Reports*.

¹⁴⁵ This theme is pervasive in General Westmoreland’s book *A Soldier Reports*; allusions to duty, honor and country; the character of officership, and his personal code are ubiquitous in the volume.

Vietnam] began to wage people's or insurgency warfare with the purpose of seizing control in the South."¹⁴⁶ The reality of the war was at odds with how he was trying to win it.

As there is considerably less information available on General Stilwell, it is much more difficult to assess his personality. Suffice it to say that his writing "Army Activities in Underdeveloped Areas Short of Declared War," implies a penchant for military theory and organization; particularly in unconventional military matters. Further, his commentary on "The United States, Japan, and the Security of Korea" reinforces his desire to construct a principled argument within a logical military framework as outlined in the "Military Mindset" analysis in Section A of this chapter above. While these writings are likely more demonstrative of the nature of their purpose – military analysis – than of the man himself, they provide a slight peek behind the face and into how his mind works. Coupled with the actions he took during the tree-felling incident, it would be reasonable to conclude that he was a logical thinker, who was decisive in action when convinced of the virtue of his cause. A very close match to the profile of a logical decision-maker, with a penchant for organization, a talent for working within an orderly system, a resistance to change, and demonstrated risk averseness.

Section B. Recommendations

As stated earlier, the intent of the analysis in this monograph is to provide some reference points for senior leaders to reflect on in order to help the senior leader know himself or herself better. Through reflection and study, leaders can educate themselves about their strengths and weaknesses, learn to be more open-minded, and learn to identify and consider innovative solutions to today's and tomorrow's problems. Therefore, the recommendations in this monograph will not focus on indicting or changing current military processes for grooming and developing senior leaders, rather it will focus on some major characteristics that senior leaders

¹⁴⁶ Vien, "Reflections on the Vietnam War," 2-3.

have a proclivity towards, and provide some awareness of those characteristics and their possible pitfalls. The recommendations will therefore be focused on the major aspects of the profile: physical, experience, military mindset, Western mindset, and personality.

Physical

The implications of the major physical aspects of race, age, and sex manifest themselves primarily in the arena of identity. While this study is not suggesting one should apologize for their race, age, or sex; it is simply important to realize that those characteristics influence how and what people think. Ethnographic studies imply that Caucasians generally consider themselves as entitled to develop and enforce what they consider universal normative standards.¹⁴⁷ The identity of a successful, elderly (50+ years of age), white male is one supported by decades of success that affirm his behavior and performance as better than that of those around him. In short, it is important to realize that the attributes of personal success are not universal and that the decisions made an elderly, white male are likely to differ from those made by a successful, elderly, Hispanic, female. Both decisions will likely reflect what the individuals value; likely, again, to be different. Understanding and considering why others might think differently will help make a better informed decision. The key, then, is to surround one's self with a group of advisors with varied backgrounds, experience levels, and perspectives.

Experience

Senior leaders generally come from the "core" branches of their services. Generally those branches are the tactical, combat branches. They have extensive experience at the tactical levels which occurred during their formative years as a military professional and have less extensive

¹⁴⁷ Perry, "Identity," 244.

experience at the operational and strategic levels, almost all of which occurred much later in their careers; generally after they were already tenured, successful military professionals.

Experiences, again relate to identity. Senior officers' identities are closely tied to their perceptions of themselves as tactical operators. There is therefore an inclination to focus on the areas that the senior leader is most familiar with versus the areas that he or she probably should. In this, the senior leader should recognize that there are other competent professionals who can and will focus on and can influence the result of the current, tactical operation. The senior leader is likely one of only a handful of people who can influence operational and strategic concerns such as logistics and developing and implementing the overarching military strategy that are often not within the purview of the current tactical situation. In short, senior leaders' focus should be on operational and strategic matters; many of which are very different from those the "core" combat tactician is comfortable with.

Military Mindset

The military mindset is characterized by a feeling of profound responsibility for security of the nation, an inclination for a strong extant military force, strong adversity to accepting risk in military security, and a rigid definition of success. These characteristics are often strengths for the military professional, but can hamper judgment in some ways. In juxtaposition to these, it is important for senior leaders to continually reinforce to themselves that state security is more than just military and security is often a zero sum game among competitors – if one country feels more secure, another likely feels less secure. Further, inflexibly adhering to rigid definitions of success can be an impediment to the peace process; reconciliation requires negotiation.

Western Mindset

The Western mindset is dominated by the concept of Orientalism and control. The key concept here is to recognize that U.S. military leaders are predominantly Western in thought and

mindset; this characteristic influences and reduces the solution set in the minds of the leader. Leaders must recognize that the Western way is not the only acceptable way, and often unacceptable in non-Western culture. Moreover, unless the U.S. intends to remain in the area of operations indefinitely, non-Western warfare almost always requires a non-Western solution. Finally, control of outputs is a Western conception largely based on the Western predilection to solve problems scientifically. Eastern solutions will often rely on guiding versus controlling outputs.

Personality

Military leaders are primarily logical decision makers who are take charge leaders; who efficiently implement a system of orderly solutions to problems; and who avoid organizational conflict, are resistant to change, and are risk averse. Again, the key is to recognize that these traits are strongly resident in the personality of the senior military leader. In and of themselves, these characteristics are not harmful, in fact they are often desirable, and are likely why so many senior leaders possess them. The key again, is to recognize that the solution space to current and future problems is limited if it precludes things like organizational conflict, adversity to risk, and resistance to change. The way to mitigate this is through diversity. Surrounding one's self with advisors, both civilian and military, who think differently. Another technique is to require courses of action that fall outside of the realm of what the senior leader feels comfortable with. By requiring a prospective solution that entails large organizational changes, puts organizations in conflict with one another, or assumes large risks; the senior leader exposes himself to a wider panoply of options which at least allows the possibility for innovation to take place.

Chapter 4: Conclusions

This monograph examined whether today's military processes and culture adequately develop and prepare senior officers to render clear, objective, useful advice to their civilian leaders, and asserted that advice from senior military leaders was largely based on a culture that

overwhelmingly rewards tactical success and breeds senior military leaders who are conservative and conformist in nature. The study posited that the inability of senior leaders to understand their personal biases toward quick, tactical solutions and their Western-based conceptions of Orientalism could inevitably lead to tainted and oftentimes bad strategic military advice to senior civilian leaders. This study confirmed the assertions above by creating and validating the senior leader profile in the figure below.

1.	Physical
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Age: 50+ – Sex: male – Race: Caucasian
2.	Experience
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – “Core” service professional (combat arms, fighter/bomber pilot, surface warfare officer, etc.) – Successful tactical leader with many years of experience in tactical-level units and as tactical-unit leaders – Limited-moderate experience at operational and strategic levels
3.	Military Mindset
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Feels a profound responsibility to provide for the security of the state – Stresses existing risks to the state and emphasizes and magnifies the immediacy of those threats – Favor an overwhelmingly strong, extant military capability – Risk averse; inflates the capabilities of enemies; overstates requirement for United States military capability – Rigidly seeks to attain overwhelming mission success; failure to accomplish a given mission is equivalent to complete failure; uncomfortable with the concept of compromises to mission success
4.	Western Mindset
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Orientalist: sees non-western cultures as inferior; wants to dominate and control the actions on non-westerners – Thrives on existential crises (everything is an emergency); identifies with the underdog – Seeks to control the situation; focuses on direct solutions – Rational behavior is defined by taking actions to control the environment; irrational behavior is inaction or action that does not seek control
5.	Personality
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – MBTI profile: TJ; Logical Decision Maker; make decisions based on principles and processes; rigorous implementer of decisions and visions – Good organizer and take-charge leader who provide an efficient and orderly system – Avoids organizational conflict; works well within an established system or bureaucracy – Resistant to change and risk averse; prefers stability

Figure 5: Profile of Senior Military Leader

In order to overcome any negative consequences of the characteristics associated with this profile, this monograph recommends that senior leaders first become as self-aware of the inherent constraints to behavior and action that the profile suggests. This will help the leader to consider the implications of his personal biases before thinking about solutions and making decisions. Second, this monograph recommends that senior leaders surround themselves with a diverse group of advisors and analysts who think both similarly and differently from the senior

leader. By surrounding himself with diverse staff with varied backgrounds, the senior leader will expose himself to different views. By considering those different views, the leader will allow innovation to take place and make better, more informed decisions.

Finally, these characteristics are present for a reason. They likely are the Darwinian product of an evolution that chose the fittest traits for survival because they work – they ensure the nation has the best senior officers available to ensure the security of the nation. The main question is whether this Darwinian evolution which is based on successes of the past is adequate for success in the future.

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